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REGULATING CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN RESEARCH: 
THE PAPER TIGER NEEDS REAL TEETH 
JESSE A. GOLDNER* 
INTRODUCTION 
[T]ell doctors that they have a “conflict of interest” in relation to a proposed 
protocol for research with human subjects, and they believe that you have 
accused them of unethical behavior. . . . [D]octors tend to assume that a 
conflict of interest exists only when they actually have made a “bad” decision 
motivated by their financial interest in the sponsor of their research.  
Lawyers . . . view conflicts as objective, structural, and rule–based.  You could 
be a paragon of virtue, and you would be conflicted out of representing a client 
if a prohibited conflict of interest exists.  Doctors, in contrast, view conflicts of 
interest as relating to the individual’s character and ability to resist temptation.  
We lawyers might say that doctors just don’t get it when . . . we get defensive 
at their response and fail to understand their starting point.1 
The scope of conflicts of interest in research is broad and dynamic.  As 
suggested in this introductory quote from an article by Sandra Johnson, the 
2008 Richard J. Childress Memorial Lecture Keynote Speaker,2 there is a 
fundamental disconnect between how conflicts of interest are viewed in law 
versus medicine.3  Further, within the medical community itself, clinical 
researchers approach, perceive, and respond to conflicts of interest quite 
 
* John D. Valentine Professor of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law, Professor of Law 
in Psychiatry and Professor of Pediatrics, Saint Louis University School of Medicine.  The 
research and editorial assistance of Elizabeth Gluck (Saint Louis University, J.D. 2009) and the 
research assistance of Erin Brooks (J.D. Candidate, Saint Louis University, Class of 2010) is 
gratefully acknowledged. 
 1. Sandra H. Johnson, Five Easy Pieces: Motifs of Health Law, 14 HEALTH MATRIX 131, 
131–32 (2004) (footnote omitted). 
 2. This year’s Richard J. Childress Memorial Lecture, coinciding with Professor Johnson’s 
retirement from teaching, honored her esteemed career as a teacher and scholar.  See Symposium, 
Saint Louis University School of Law Richard J. Childress Memorial Lecture: Still Crazy After 
All These Years: Is Regulating Physician Practice an Exercise in Futility? (Oct. 17, 2008), in 
Sandra H. Johnson, Regulating Physician Behavior: Taking Doctors’ “Bad Law” Claims 
Seriously, 53 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 973 (2009). 
 3. Johnson, supra note 1, at 131; Michelle M. Mello & Troyen A. Brennan, Demystifying 
the Law/Science Disconnect, 26 J. HEALTH, POL. POL’Y & L. 429, 429 (2001). 
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differently.  No doubt, the vast majority of researchers comply with whatever 
institutional or federal regulatory requirements apply to them.  For many, the 
rationales are obvious: regulatory requirements both protect the integrity of the 
research process and help ensure public support of the research enterprise.  For 
others, perhaps at times they comply reluctantly—because regulatory 
requirements are perceived as simply one more time-consuming effort in a 
large series of bureaucratic steps that seemingly must be followed to enable 
researchers to pursue their research.  But when violations come to light at least 
publicly, the typical consequence for both the investigator (and sometimes to 
the institution) seems to be little more than embarrassment.  One could readily 
describe the current regulatory regime as simply a paper tiger.  In the absence 
of truly significant government regulation of these conflicts in research, the 
varied approaches pose unique challenges for institutions that support such 
research.4 
This article will address the current state of conflicts of interest in research.  
Following a discussion in Section I of how the academic research environment 
has changed over the past twenty-five years, Section II will consider recent 
empirical research on such conflicts.  The data suggests, contrary to beliefs 
held by many clinicians and researchers, that conflicts of interest can and often 
do, at least unconsciously, affect how they behave and the outcomes of their 
studies.  Section II will also review additional recent empirical analyses, 
directed to the question of how potential research subjects view disclosure of 
conflicts of interest.  Section III will touch on a number of widely publicized 
research “scandals” involving conflicts of interest that likely have had a 
negative effect on public support for the research enterprise, but also may well 
result in the delivery of lower quality of care when clinicians reject otherwise 
good science out of concern for the apparent conflicts of interest in published 
research. 
Section IV will discuss current federal regulations and initiatives by 
institutions and professional organizations to further guide researchers.  The 
nature of the historical resistance to placing any significant limitations on 
conflicts of interest stems from a wide variety of attitudes by researchers that 
affect their behavior.  Such attitudes can be grouped into general categories, 
and Section V presents a “Taxonomy of Researchers,” based primarily on my 
own membership on a university conflict of interest committee over a four year 
period. 
Section VI will discuss how, once identified, conflicts of interest are 
typically managed by institutions, and critiques by the Office of the Inspector 
General of the Department of Health and Human Services (OIG) of the federal 
 
 4. “Research,” as it is used in this article, means “a systematic investigation, including 
research development, testing, and evaluation, designed to develop or contribute to generalizable 
knowledge.”  45 C.F.R. § 46.102(d) (2008). 
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government’s role in the current interplay between government agencies, 
sponsors, and institutions in regulating conflicts.  Collectively, Sections I 
through VI will demonstrate that the existing world of conflict of interest 
regulations is shamefully inadequate.  Section VII will, therefore, set forth a 
proposal for reform of the way conflicts of interest are managed at both the 
federal and institutional levels.  As Section VII will argue, the conflict of 
interest picture is not entirely bleak, and the adoption of a critically necessary 
uniform set of governmental regulations could help minimize the likelihood of 
further scandals and help restore public confidence in research. 
This article will not address non-financial conflicts presented by 
researchers’ efforts to climb the academic ladder.5  While real, these conflicts, 
arguably, are unavoidable given the nature of the academic enterprise.  Also 
beyond the scope of this article are institutional conflicts of interest6 and 
conflicts of interest that may be presented by membership on an Institutional 
Review Board (IRB).7 
I.  CHANGES IN THE RESEARCH ENVIRONMENT AND THE EFFECTS ON 
CONFLICTS OF INTEREST 
Universities, prior to the 1970s, and through the 1980s, were governed to a 
significant extent by what can be termed the “collegial ethos.”  The institutions 
were perceived as having a public interest mission, whether they were public 
or private not-for-profits.8  The relationship between the university and 
external institutions generally emphasized the former’s financial independence 
from the latter.9  Another aspect, internal relationships, also emphasized 
 
 5. See Norman G. Levinsky, Nonfinancial Conflicts of Interest in Research, 347 NEW ENG. 
J. MED. 759, 759 (2002). 
 6. See Eric G. Campbell et al., Institutional Academic-Industry Relationships, 298 JAMA 
1779 (2007); Michael M.E. Johns et al., Restoring Balance to Industry-Academia Relationships in 
an Era of Institutional Financial Conflicts of Interest, 289 JAMA 741, 741 (2003); Hamilton 
Moses III et al., Collaborating with Industry—Choices for the Academic Medical Center, 347 
NEW. ENG. J. MED 1371, 1371 (2002); see also Nicholas H. Steneck, Institutional and Individual 
Responsibilities for Integrity in Research, 2 AM. J. BIOETHICS 51 (2002). 
 7. See Eric G. Campbell et al., Financial Relationships Between Institutional Review Board 
Members and Industry, 355 NEW. ENG. J. MED. 2321, 2321 (2006). 
 8. See AM. ASS’N OF UNIV. PROFESSORS, 1940 STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES ON ACADEMIC 
FREEDOM AND TENURE 3 (2006) [hereinafter AAUP, 1940 STATEMENT], available at 
http://www.aaup.org/NR/rdonlyres/EBB1B330-33D3-4A51-B534-CEE0C7A90DAB/0/1940State 
mentofPrinciplesonAcademicFreedomandTenure.pdf (“Institutions of higher education are 
conducted for the common good and not to further the interest of either the individual teacher or 
the institution as a whole.  The common good depends upon the free search for truth and its free 
exposition.” (footnote omitted)).  For-profit institutions of higher education rarely have the 
conduct of research as part of their mission.  See RICHARD S. RUCH, HIGHER ED, INC.: THE RISE 
OF THE FOR-PROFIT UNIVERSITY (2003). 
 9. See AAUP, 1940 STATEMENT, supra note 8. 
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independence, focusing on the central role of faculty rights to academic 
freedom that provide faculty with the autonomy and independence to define 
and control their work.10  That academic freedom is essential to enable faculty 
to work in a way that fulfills the university’s public mission and its social role 
as a public trust, free from the influence of third parties such as university 
administrators, the government, or commercial enterprises.11  The government, 
to a large extent, and perhaps only until more recently, has trusted the 
universities to do the right thing and to govern themselves because, after all, 
the Ivory Tower was just that—relatively unaffected by the capitalist ethos of 
pursuing profit, especially in a particularly aggressive manner.12 
Beyond ordinary salary support for research, there was little, perhaps other 
than tenure, promotion, and increased collegial recognition, which individuals 
could obtain through their research efforts within the university.  Prior to the 
1980s, little public attention was paid to pharmaceutical and device 
manufacturers and other corporate entities that offered the kinds of valuable 
financial incentives to engage in collaborative efforts with faculty members 
that they currently offer.13  This is likely because, relatively speaking, little 
such behavior was occurring.  The perception was that university researchers 
were people who had chosen to forgo greater financial rewards in the public 
sector for the noble, bucolic, but relatively poverty-stricken, academic 
environment.  The external public had little interest in the financial aspects of 
the “research environment.” 
The minimal focus on the research enterprise that existed dealt largely with 
the treatment of research subjects, courtesy of the Nazi experiments,14 Henry 
 
 10. Risa L. Lieberwitz, Confronting the Privatization and Commercialization of Academic 
Research: An Analysis of Social Implications at the Local, National, and Global Levels, 12 IND. 
J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 109, 109–10 (2005). 
 11. Id. at 109–10, 114–15. 
 12. Id. at 113, 115–16; see DEREK BOK, UNIVERSITIES IN THE MARKETPLACE: THE 
COMMERCIALIZATION OF HIGHER EDUCATION 185–98 (2003); LAWRENCE C. SOLEY, LEASING 
THE IVORY TOWER: THE CORPORATE TAKEOVER OF ACADEMIA 5–15 (1995); JENNIFER 
WASHBURN, UNIVERSITY INC.: THE CORPORATE CORRUPTION OF AMERICAN HIGHER 
EDUCATION 103–36 (2005). 
 13. See Dana Katz et al., All Gifts Large and Small: Toward an Understanding of the Ethics 
of Pharmaceutical Industry Gift-Giving, 3 AM. J. BIOETHICS 39, 39 (2003); see also, S. 
Madhavan et al, The Gift Relationship Between Pharmaceutical Companies and Physicians: An 
Exploratory Survey of Physicians, 22 J. CLINICAL PHARMACY & THERAPEUTICS 207, 211–13 
(1997). 
 14. See generally ROBERT JAY LIFTON, THE NAZI DOCTORS: MEDICAL KILLING AND THE 
PSYCHOLOGY OF GENOCIDE (1986); THE NAZI DOCTORS AND THE NUREMBERG CODE: HUMAN 
RIGHTS IN HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION (George J. Annas & Michael A. Grodin eds., 1992) 
(suggesting that the trial of Nazi physicians in post-World War II Nuremberg, Germany can be 
used as a basis from which to question the permissible limits of human experimentation and the 
focus on universal ethical codes within the context of the criminal trial). 
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Beecher’s article in the New England Journal of Medicine chronicling 
previously unidentified unethical activities by researchers in the United 
States,15 and the Tuskegee Syphilis Study.16  Congressional hearings on these 
concerns led to the passage of the National Research Act of 1974.17 
The Act created the National Commission for the Protection of Human 
Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research18 that issued the Belmont 
Report,19 which set forth ethical principles for the conduct of human research.  
The Act also called for the issuance of federal regulations establishing certain 
requirements for institutions conducting such research.20  Among these 
requirements was a mandate that institutions receiving federal funds enter into 
assurances with the federal government that research be conducted in an 
ethical manner.  They also required that the institutions develop IRBs that 
would conduct a risk-benefit analysis of a research proposal and review both 
the proposed content of the information provided to obtain potential subjects in 
an effort to obtain informed consent and the method of doing so.21  But there 
was preciously little in the Belmont Report that even alluded to potential 
conflicts of interest, nor is there a single word about conflicts of interest in the 
federal IRB regulations, which have remained largely unchanged in the human 
subjects research context since the late 1970s.22 
 
 15. Henry K. Beecher, Ethics and Clinical Research, 274 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1354, 1354 
(1966). 
 16. See JAMES H. JONES, BAD BLOOD: THE TUSKEGEE SYPHILIS EXPERIMENT, at ix (New & 
Expanded ed. 1993). 
 17. National Research Service Award Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93–348, 88 Stat. 342 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (2006)); see generally Jesse A. Goldner, 
An Overview of Legal Controls on Human Experimentation and the Regulatory Implications of 
Taking Professor Katz Seriously, 38 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 63 (1993).  For a history of the events that 
led up to the development of regulations on the conduct of research with human subjects, see 
COLEMAN ET AL., THE ETHICS AND REGULATION OF RESEARCH WITH HUMAN SUBJECTS 
§§ 1.03–2.01, at 16–61 (2005). 
 18. National Research Service Award Act of 1974 § 201; see COLEMAN ET AL, supra note 
17, § 2.01, at 52. 
 19. COLEMAN ET AL., supra note 17, § 2.01, at 52; NAT’L COMM’N FOR THE PROTECTION 
OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL & BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, THE BELMONT REPORT: 
ETHICAL PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF 
RESEARCH (1979) [hereinafter BELMONT REPORT], available at http://ohsr.od.nih.gov/guidelines/ 
belmont.html. 
 20. National Research Service Award Act of 1974, §§ 211–12. 
 21. Id. § 212. 
 22. 45 C.F.R. § 46.101–.409 (2008); see, e.g., Carol Mason Spicer, Federal Oversight and 
Regulation of Human Subjects Research—An Update, 10 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 261, 263 
(2000) (noting various statements released by the Department of Health and Human Services 
(HHS), including the need for additional guidance regarding conflicts of interest in research 
involving human subjects); see generally COLEMAN ET AL., supra note 17, § 2.01, at 51–61 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
1216 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 53:1211 
At best, and only by inference, the issue of conflicts of interest might 
conceivably come into play in two ways.  First, in an IRB’s analysis of risk,23 
it may find that there is the attenuated possibility that a financial conflict of 
interest might lead an investigator to (a) cheat on inclusion and exclusion 
criteria when recruiting subjects, (b) inappropriately keep subjects on a 
protocol in order to complete the study, or (c) falsify data in an effort to make a 
test article24 appear safer and more efficacious than the actual facts would 
suggest.  A second, again inferential and related reference to conflicts of 
interest, might be seen in the section of the federal regulations that details the 
elements of informed consent that requires a description of “any reasonably 
foreseeable risks.”25 
The university academic environment has changed radically, yet there is no 
one cause to which this change can be attributed.  Far more research, 
percentage-wise, is supported by private sources than by the federal 
government.26  As of 2003, academic health centers performed nearly thirty 
 
(providing an overview of governmental oversight of research with human subjects from the 
1960s to 1990s). 
 23. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.111(a)(1)–(2); accord 21 C.F.R. § 56.111(a)(1)–(2) (2008). 
 24. A “test article” is any drug, biological product, or medical device for human use.  21 
C.F.R § 56.102(1). 
 25. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a)(2); accord 21 C.F.R. § 50.25(a)(2). 
26. Although the federal government has been the primary source of funding for clinical 
research in the past, it has been superseded by private industry in the last decade.  There is 
a pronounced trend toward a greater percentage of research being funded by the private 
sector.  One study has shown that 28% of life sciences faculty received private sponsor 
funding.  In 1986, the private sector funded 42% of health care research and development.  
By 1995, the private sector’s allocation of research dollars had risen to 52%.  This equated 
to a three-fold increase, from approximately $6 billion to $19 billion.  Thus, although 
federal funding of research has incrementally increased over time, the private funding has 
increased exponentially. 
Patricia C. Kuszler, Curing Conflicts of Interest in Clinical Research: Impossible Dreams and 
Harsh Realities, 8 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 115, 118–19 (2001) (footnotes omitted). 
Biomedical research funding increased from $37.1 billion in 1994 to $94.3 billion in 2003 
and doubled when adjusted for inflation.  Principal research sponsors in 2003 were 
industry (57%) and the National Institutes of Health (28%).  Relative proportions from all 
public and private sources did not change.  Industry sponsorship of clinical trials 
increased from $4.0 to $14.2 billion (in real terms) while federal proportions devoted to 
basic and applied research were unchanged.  The United States spent an estimated 5.6% of 
its total health expenditures on biomedical research, more than any other country, but less 
than 0.1% for health services research.  From an economic perspective, biotechnology and 
medical device companies were most productive, as measured by new diagnostic and 
therapeutic devices per dollar of research and development cost.  Productivity declined for 
new pharmaceuticals. 
Hamilton Moses III et al., Financial Anatomy of Biomedical Research, 294 JAMA 1333, 1333 
(2005); see also David Blumenthal et al., University-Industry Research Relationships in 
Biotechnology: Implications for the University, 232 SCIENCE 1361, 1364 (1986). 
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percent of all the health care research and development in the United States 
and more than fifty percent of research supported by the National Institutes of 
Health (NIH).27  Nonetheless, there has been a significant shift in research 
from academic centers to private hospitals and physicians in private practice.28  
Increasing costs of bringing drugs and devices to market29 have led industry to 
look elsewhere in an effort to avoid the bureaucracy endemic to universities, 
and move research sites to private physicians and to for-profit contract research 
organizations and other independent research enterprises.30  The Bayh-Dole 
Act, passed in 1980, encourages academic institutions, supported by federal 
grants, to patent and license new products developed by their faculty members 
and to share royalties with the researchers.31  In many respects this legislation, 
though designed to facilitate the transfer of technology from academic 
institutions to bedside, has had the unintended consequence of blurring 
distinctions between academic entities and researchers on the one hand and 
commercial entities on the other. 
Even while seeking non-academic research environments to conduct 
research, industry recognizes that academic clinicians remain the “thought 
leaders”32 and are very willing to handsomely reward such individuals for 
giving continuing medical education talks that are likely to increase the sales 
of new products, or for putting their names on academic papers to which they 
may contribute little, if anything, substantively.  The point to be made is that 
now there is money to be had—sometimes in such significant amounts as to 
dwarf an academic salary.  In 1985, 2.6% of principal investigators had 
personal financial ties to their industry sponsors, but by 1999, that figure had 
been raised to 7.6%.33  No doubt this figure has grown exponentially in the 
interim.  In 2007, 60% of departmental chairs in academic medical centers had 
some form of personal relationship with industry.34 
 
 27. THE COMMONWEALTH FUND TASK FORCE ON ACADEMIC HEALTH CTRS., ENVISIONING 
THE FUTURE OF ACADEMIC HEALTH CENTERS 3, 31 (2003), available at http://www.common 
wealthfund.org/usr_doc/ahc_envisioningfuture_600.pdf?section=4039. 
 28. See generally Thomas Bodenheimer, Uneasy Alliance—Clinical Investigators and the 
Pharmaceutical Industry, 342 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1539, 1539 (2000). 
 29. Id. at 1540. 
 30. COLEMAN ET AL., supra note 17, § 2.03, at 77–86; see, e.g., Covance: The CRO for 
Drug Development Services, http://www.covance.com/ (last visited July, 30 2009); INC 
Research, http://www.incresearch.com (last visited July 30, 2009); MDS Pharma Services, 
http://www.mdsps.com (last visited July 30, 2009), Pharmaceutical Product Development, 
http://www.ppdi.com (last visited July 30, 2009). 
 31. 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–212 (2006); see also 37 C.F.R. § 401 (2008) (implementing the Act). 
 32. See Nikolaos A. Patsopoulos et al., Origin and Funding of the Most Frequently Cited 
Papers in Medicine: Database Analysis, 332 BRIT. MED. J. 1061, 1061–63 (2006). 
 33. Elizabeth A. Boyd & Lisa A. Bero, Assessing Faculty Financial Relationships with 
Industry: A Case Study, 284 JAMA 2209, 2211 (2000). 
 34. Campbell et al., supra note 6, at 1783. 
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II.  EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF THE IMPLICATIONS OF CONFLICTS OF INTEREST 
A. Definition and Types of Conflicts 
There are numerous definitions of conflicts of interest.  For the purposes of 
this article, a conflict of interest is defined as a “set of conditions in which 
professional judgment . . . (such as a patient’s welfare or the validity of 
research) tends to be unduly influenced by a secondary interest (such as 
financial gain).”35  Examples in the research area include, but are not limited 
to: (1) various forms of payments to investigators in connection with the 
recruitment of subjects, such as per capita payments to investigators for 
recruiting subjects; (2) various forms of bonus payments for boosting subject 
enrollment or meeting enrollment deadlines; (3) finder’s fees to those who 
refer subjects to investigators; (4) gifts from industry sponsors, including 
discretionary funds, research equipment, and support for travel to professional 
meetings (often in exotic locales that more closely resemble vacations); (5) 
stock ownership; (6) highly paid consultant positions; and (7) excessive 
compensation for providing continuing medical education lectures.36 
B. Empirical Research on Clinician Behavior and Study Outcomes 
Until recently there was a relative paucity of empirical research on 
conflicts of interest and clinician behavior.  Today, a number of scholars are 
devoting significant efforts to examining issues such as physician behaviors in 
response to sponsor offers of various inducements;37 the failure of journals to 
adhere to their own guidelines regarding the publication of research and 
 
 35. Justin E. Bekelman et al., Scope and Impact of Financial Conflicts of Interest in 
Biomedical Research: A Systematic Review, 289 JAMA 454, 454 (2003) (quoting Dennis F. 
Thompson, Understanding Financial Conflicts of Interest, 329 NEW ENG. J. MED. 573, 573 
(1993)). 
 36. Jesse A. Goldner, Dealing with Conflicts of Interest in Biomedical Research: IRB 
Oversight as the Next Best Solution to the Abolitionist Approach, 28 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 379, 
381–84 (2000); see Neal Dickert et al., Paying Research Subjects: An Analysis of Current 
Policies, 136 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 368 (2002); Neal Dickert & Christine Grady, What’s the 
Price of a Research Subject? Approaches to Payment for Research Participation, 341 NEW ENG. 
J. MED. 198 (1999); Trudo Lemmens & Paul B. Miller, The Human Subjects Trade: Ethical and 
Legal Issues Surrounding Recruitment Incentives, 31 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 398 (2003); see 
generally COLEMAN ET AL., supra note 17, § 5.02, at 235–37. 
 37. Jason Dana & George Loewenstein, A Social Science Perspective on Gifts to Physicians 
from Industry, 290 JAMA 252 (2003); Madhavan et al., supra note 13; Bruce M. Psaty & 
Drummond Rennie, Clinical Trial Investigators and Their Prescribing Patterns: Another 
Dimension to the Relationship Between Physician Investigators and the Pharmaceutical Industry, 
295 JAMA 2787 (2006); David M. Studdert et al., Financial Conflicts of Interest in Physicians’ 
Relationships with the Pharmaceutical Industry—Self-Regulation in the Shadow of Federal 
Prosecution, 351 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1891 (2004). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2009] REGULATING CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN RESEARCH 1219 
conflicts of interest;38 relationships between financial conflicts of interest and 
voting patterns at Food and Drug Administration (FDA) advisory committee 
meetings;39 and relationships between individuals reporting conflicts of interest 
and the likelihood that they would report positive results on the one hand,40 
and the extremely small likelihood, on the other hand, that authors with 
conflicts of interest would publish negative results.41 
Data from empirical research examining conflicts of interest in clinical 
medicine and research is not at all surprising, but rather, it is disheartening.  
There is a statistically significant relationship between positive findings in 
studies funded by for-profit entities versus those funded by not-for-profit 
sources,42 between industry sponsorship and pro-industry conclusions,43 and 
between author conflicts of interest and the greater likelihood of reporting a 
drug to be superior to placebo.44  Industry funding may result in study designs 
that are more likely to lead to favorable results, such as utilizing protocols that 
involve placebos or other poor comparators, doses that are inappropriate, 
carefully constituted experimental populations, inappropriate surrogate 
endpoints, trials whose lengths are sufficiently short so as to be unlikely to 
show side effects, and definitions that are unlikely to show activity or not 
likely to show side effects.45  Industry sponsorship is also associated with 
 
 38. Joel Lexchin et al., Pharmaceutical Industry Sponsorship and Research Outcome and 
Quality: Systemic Review, 326 BRIT. MED. J. 1167, 1167 (2003); Susan Mayor, Surgery Journal 
Bans Authors Who Hide Conflicts of Interest, 332 BRIT. MED. J. 135, 135 (2006). 
 39. Peter Lurie et al., Financial Conflict of Interest Disclosure and Voting Patterns at Food 
and Drug Administration Drug Advisory Committee Meetings, 295 JAMA 1921, 1921 (2006). 
 40. Bekelman, supra note 35; Mohit Bhandari et al., Association Between Industry Funding 
and Statistically Significant Pro-Industry Findings in Medical and Surgical Randomized Trials, 
170 CAN. MED. ASS’N J. 477, 477 (2004); Lee S. Friedman & Elihu D. Richter, Relationship 
Between Conflicts of Interest and Research Results, 19 J. GENERAL INTERNAL MED. 51 (2004); 
Robert E. Kelly, Jr. et al., Relationship Between Drug Company Funding and Outcomes of 
Clinical Psychiatric Research, 36 PSYCHOL. MED. 1647 (2006); Lexchin et al., supra note 38; 
Patsopoulos et al., supra note 32, at 1061; Roy H. Perlis et al., Industry Sponsorship and 
Financial Conflict of Interest in the Reporting of Clinical Trials in Psychiatry, 162 AM. J. 
PSYCHIATRY 10 (2005); John Yaphe et al., The Association Between Funding by Commercial 
Interests and Study Outcome in Randomized Controlled Drug Trials, 18 FAM. PRAC. 565, 565–68 
(2001).  But see Thomas P. Stossel, A Biopsy of Financial Conflicts of Interest in Medicine, 143 
SURGERY 193, 196 (2008). 
 41. Friedman & Richter, supra note 40, at 53, 55. 
 42. Paul M. Ridker & Jose Torres, Reported Outcomes in Major Cardiovascular Clinical 
Trials Funded by For-profit and Not-for-Profit Organizations, 295 JAMA 2270, 2272 (2006). 
 43. Bekelman et al., supra note 35, at 463; Bhandari et al., supra note 40, at 478–79; 
Friedman & Richter, supra note 40, at 55; Kelly et al., supra note 40, at 1653; Lexchin et al., 
supra note 38, at 1169. 
 44. Perlis et al., supra note 40, at 19. 
 45. Sergio Sismondo, How Pharmaceutical Industry Funding Affects Trial Outcomes: 
Causal Structures and Responses, 66 SOC. SCI. & MED 1909, 1910–12 (2008). 
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restrictions on publication and data sharing.46  Such restrictions and the 
selective reporting of more favorable pro-protocol analysis can result in 
erroneous conclusions based on published data.47  On the purely clinical side, 
for example, research has shown that a drug company’s hosting of an all-
expense-paid trip to a resort for a seminar had substantial effects on the 
attendee-physicians’ prescribing patterns.48  More generally, it has been shown 
“that favors and promotional items of negligible value can influence behavior 
of the recipient in ways the recipient does not often realize.”49  As Dr. Arthur 
Caplan, director of the Center for Bioethics at the University of Pennsylvania’s 
School of Medicine, has noted: 
Even small gifts can influence behavior . . . . 
The doctors who say, “I can’t be bought for a piece of pizza or a free box of 
doughnuts,” aren’t paying attention to what empirical science shows influences 
people . . . . It isn’t just a drug company giving out $25,000 to give a talk and 
go on a nice vacation—that would certainly influence you.  But even if (a drug 
rep) shows up with a free lunch every week for 50 weeks, it tends to build a 
sense of reciprocity on the part of the people who get the free gift.50 
C. Empirical Studies of the Effects of Disclosures of Conflicts of Interest on 
Research Participants 
Another area of empirical research related to conflicts of interest in the 
research enterprise has been the reactions and perceptions of research subjects 
to disclosures regarding conflicts of interest.  For the most part, these studies 
have demonstrated little concern on the part of participants with the nature of 
the disclosures made. 
Thus, for example, in one study  patients with diabetes or asthma were read 
descriptions of a hypothetical clinical trial with one of five financial disclosure 
 
 46. Bekelman, et al., supra note 35, at 454; Jerome M. Stern & R. John Simes, Publication 
Bias: Evidence of Delayed Publication in a Cohort Study of Clinical Research Projects, 315 
BRIT. MED. J. 640, 644 (1997). 
 47. Frank Peinemann et al., Negative Pressure Wound Therapy: Potential Publication Bias 
Caused by Lack of Access to Unpublished Study Results Data, 8 BMC MED. RESEARCH METHOD. 
4, 4 (2008), http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2288/8/4. 
 48. James P. Orlowski & Leon Wateska, The Effects of Pharmaceutical Firm Enticements 
on Physician Prescribing Patterns: There’s No Such Thing as a Free Lunch, 102 CHEST 270, 
270–71 (1992); see also Sarah Boseley & Rob Evans, Drug Giants Accused Over Doctors’ Perks, 
THE GUARDIAN, Aug. 23, 2008, http://www.guardian.co.uk/society/2008/aug/23/health.pharma 
ceuticals. 
 49. Katz et al., supra note 13, at 42; see also COLEMAN ET AL., supra note 17, § 2.02, at 61–
77. 
 50. Janet Moore, U Plan: Ban All Gifts to Doctors, MINN. STAR TRIB., Oct. 21, 2008, at 1A 
(quoting Arthur Caplan, Dir., Ctr. for Bioethics at the Univ. Penn. Sch. of Med.) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
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statements: (1) a generic disclosure that the principal investigator might benefit 
financially; (2) the principal investigator would receive per capita payments 
from the sponsor to support salaries of research staff and supplies; (3) the study 
is supported by the sponsor, and the principal investigator receives additional 
money for consulting, giving speeches, or writing reports; (4) the principal 
investigator has an investment in the sponsor’s stock and therefore could gain 
or lose money depending on the results; and (5) the institution conducting the 
study has an investment in the sponsor’s stock.51  The study results indicated 
respondents were sensitive to some of the financial interest disclosed, and that, 
in particular, they viewed ownership of equity interests less favorably than 
receiving per capita payments ,52 with other financial conflicts falling between 
these two extremes.53  Nonetheless, patients’ willingness to participate did not 
substantially differ among other types of disclosure, as 45% to 59% were very 
willing to participate.54  Other factors, such as potential benefits and risks and 
the purposes of the research were deemed to be more important in making a 
decision.55  Some respondents were surprised to learn about the equity interests 
and expressed concern if they were not disclosed.56  Some 59% felt that the 
possibility that the researcher or institute might benefit financially did not 
change their trust in the researcher or institution.57  Over a third of the 
respondents, however, were less trusting in the researchers and institutions as a 
result of the disclosures.58  For some, of course, the disclosure might have 
increased trust based on the potential participants’ perception of increased 
honesty.59  In general, however, changes in trust did seem to be related to 
variations in an individual’s willingness to participate in a study, but there was 
a perception that financial interests lowered the scientific quality of the 
hypothetical trial.60  Other similar studies showed that types of disclosures had 
little or no influence.61 
In another study, involving patients in cancer-research trials, nearly 90% 
expressed little or no worry about financial ties of researchers or institutions, 
 
 51. Kevin P. Weinfurt et al., Effects of Disclosing Financial Interests on Attitudes Toward 
Clinical Research, 23 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 860, 861 (2008). 
 52. Id.; accord Lindsay A. Hampson et al., Patients’ Views on Financial Conflicts of Interest 
in Cancer Research Trials, 355 N.EW ENG. J. MED. 2330, 2336 (2006). 
 53. Weinfurt et al., supra note 51, at 862. 
 54. Id. at 864. 
 55. Id. at 862. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Weinfurt et al., supra note 51, at 862, 864. 
 59. Id. at 864. 
 60. Id. at 863–64. 
 61. Jeffrey N. Gibbs & Gregory A. Guagnano, Investigator Financial Disclosures and Its 
Effect on Research Subjects, 62 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 727, 735 (2007). 
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including researchers receiving speakers’ fees (82%), consulting fees (75%), 
royalty payments (70%), and stock ownership (77%).62  Less than 15% of 
patients indicated that knowledge of a financial tie would have kept them from 
participating.63  Eighty-one percent believed it was ethical for a researcher 
whose drug was being evaluated in the trial to receive speaking fees, and 82% 
thought it was ethical to receive consulting fees.64  Seventeen percent of the 
participants thought that no disclosure to patients was even necessary, while 
some 40% said they wanted disclosure of the oversight system for the 
researcher, and 31% believed that there should be a requirement to disclose all 
financial ties.65 
In one further study, using focus groups of potential research participants, 
the individuals wanted to know about financial interests, irrespective of 
whether or not those would affect their participation. 66  The study indicated 
that potential research participants varied in both the desire and ability to 
understand the nature and implications of information provided.67  It further 
concluded that as a result of the group sessions, participants were better able to 
identify information they would want to obtain.68 
Finally, in what the authors, Christine Grady and her colleagues, indicated 
was the first published qualitative study reporting research participants’ views 
regarding financial interests of investigators,69 the study design involved a 
face-to-face, semi-structured interview with patients with serious, life-
threatening, or chronic conditions.70  Most were long-term participants in 
clinical studies.71 
They were presented with a hypothetical clinical trial “in which the 
principal investigator [either] . . . 1) held a patent on the intervention being 
tested . . . , 2) held stock in the company that made the investigational 
intervention, 3) received consulting fees from [that] company . . . , or 4) 
received funding from the sponsoring company over and above per participant 
costs of the study.”72 
 
 62. Hampson et al., supra note 52, at 2333, 2335 tbl.3. 
 63. Id. at 2333. 
 64. Id. at 2334, 2335 tbl.4. 
 65. Id. at 2336 tbl.5. 
 66. Kevin P. Weinfurt et al., Views of Potential Research Participants on Financial 
Conflicts of Interest: Barriers and Opportunities for Effective Disclosure, 21 J. GEN. INTERNAL 
MED. 901, 903–04 (2006). 
 67. Id. at 903–05. 
 68. Id. at 904. 
 69. Christine Grady et al., The Limits of Disclosure: What Research Subjects Want to Know 
About Investigator Financial Interests, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 592, 597 (2006). 
 70. Id. at 592–93. 
 71. Id. at 593. 
 72. Id. 
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After reviewing the scenarios, almost all of the interviewees indicated that 
they trusted the researchers and the research team and would recommend the 
study to others.73  Responses to each of the scenarios ranged from “concerns 
about data integrity and ‘conflicts of interest’” to an acceptance of the idea that 
the principal investigator’s expertise and hard work deserved financial awards, 
to indifference or ambivalence, recognizing the financial rewards’ legitimacy 
“but worrying about money’s potential corrupting influence.”74 
The more educated the individual, however, the more concern was 
expressed about financial interests having a potential for manipulating or 
fudging data.75  As was noted with the prior study described above, most 
wanted to know both about the existence of an investigator’s financial 
relationship and the fact that safeguards had been put in place by the institution 
to monitor financial interests and protect data integrity.76  But, “[o]nly a few 
wanted full disclosure, including” details regarding “the amount of money an 
investigator might receive.”77  Most significantly, nearly two-thirds said that 
receiving information such as that in the four scenarios would have no impact 
on their decisions or willingness to participate, again, typically because other 
factors were more important or because they trusted institutional safeguards 
that they assumed were in place to oversee the financial conflicts.78  Some did 
not want financial information “because it did not matter to them or was 
perceived as a burden” they did not want to shoulder.79  “Several 
acknowledged that concerns about the financial interests depended on the 
severity of their clinical condition,” alternative treatment options, and “hope in 
the possibility of benefit from a trial.”80  More serious illnesses and limited 
options were associated with less concern about financial interest.81 
It is not surprising that there are indications that potential research subjects 
generally are not terribly troubled when they review consent documents 
disclosing conflicts of interest information (perhaps other than ownership of 
equity interests),82 in the sense that conflicts of interest are unlikely to cause 
them to refuse to participate in a study.  An ill individual often is unaware of 
what scholars have identified as the “therapeutic misconception.”83  Nor do 
 
 73. Id. at 594. 
 74. Grady et al., supra note 69, at 594, 595 tbl.3. 
 75. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 76. Id. at 596; see supra text accompanying notes 62–65. 
 77. Grady et al., supra note 69, at 597–98. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 597. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. See supra text accompanying notes 52–54. 
 83. See, e.g., Paul S. Appelbaum et al., False Hopes and Best Data: Consent to Research 
and the Therapeutic Misconception, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Apr. 1987, at 20; Lisa M. Arkin et 
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potential participants necessarily understand the related concept of “clinical 
equipoise.”84 
The therapeutic misconception is a fundamental confusion among research 
subjects between the goals of clinical care (improving the health of an 
individual patient) and the goals of research (generalizable knowledge).85  
Despite clear information to the contrary that may appear in consent 
documents, a patient frequently will believe that the project in which he or she 
has consented to participate was designed to benefit the patient directly, and 
not to contribute to generalizable knowledge.86  Of course, this simply is not 
true.  Patients, when asked why they agreed to be in a study, often will indicate 
that “the medication [they] will receive, they believe[ ], will be the one most 
likely to help [them].”87  The patient will, incorrectly, “rule[ ] out the 
possibility that he might receive a placebo” as that “would not be likely to do 
him much good,” thus denying that there may be major disadvantages to 
participating in research.88  In so doing, the patient would also be denying the 
possibility that the patient’s interest could well be “secondary to other demands 
on the physician-researcher’s loyalties.”89 
This confusion typically will occur because the patient may not adequately 
comprehend the nature of clinical research.  Such research generally involves 
techniques of randomization and the use of control groups.90  Each of these 
may result in the patient being placed on a placebo or perhaps on a drug that he 
or she would have received by virtue of the then existing standard of care 
without being on a protocol.  This absolute belief that the individual will 
receive the test article can be seen in comments made by respondents in some 
of the studies discussed above.91 
 
al., Confronting the Issues of Therapeutic Misconception, Enrollment Decisions, and Personal 
Motives in Genetic Medicine-Based Clinical Research Studies for Fatal Disorders, 16 HUM. 
GENE THERAPY 1028, 1029–30 (2005); Charles W. Lidz & Paul S. Appelbaum, The Therapeutic 
Misconception: Problems and Solutions, 40 MED. CARE, at V-55, V-57 (2002); Franklin G. 
Miller & Howard Brody, A Critique of Clinical Equipoise: Therapeutic Misconception in the 
Ethics of Clinical Trials, HASTINGS CENTER REP., May–June 2003, at 19, 20. 
 84. See Miller & Brody, supra note 83. 
 85. Appelbaum et al., supra note 83, at 20; see also Lidz & Appelbaum, supra note 83, at V-
57. 
 86. See Appelbaum et al., supra note 83, at 20. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 20–21. 
 91. See, e.g., Grady, et al., supra note 69, at 593–94, 596–97 (noting that “[a]lmost all” 
subjects in the study of participant attitudes toward disclosure “said they enrolled because the . . . 
study offered what looked like the best treatment option for them;” that some did not want to be 
informed because “[i]t is just too much. . . . I already know what I want.  And I don’t want to read 
anything or hear anything that’s going to deter me from getting what I came to NIH for;” that 
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Under standard of care treatment, off-protocol, the patient might well not 
have to deal with inconvenient or uncomfortable aspects of the study.  In 
addition, and perhaps of greater importance, the physician-researcher’s 
obligation to adhere to the study protocol might well mean that alterations in 
the care of the individual patient, from which he or she could potentially 
benefit, might well not occur if doing so would violate the study protocol’s 
strict requirements.92  Off-protocol, the alteration would be made.  The point 
here is that researchers 
are not offering personalized medical therapy for individual patients.  Rather, 
they seek to answer clinically relevant scientific questions by conducting 
experiments that test the safety and efficacy of treatments in groups of 
patients. . . . Protocols governing [randomized controlled trials] frequently 
restrict flexibility in dosing and use of concomitant medications.  These 
features of research design are implemented to promote scientific validity, not 
to promote therapeutic benefit.93 
Some evidence both of confusion regarding the research enterprise and of 
possible examples of therapeutic misconceptions can be found in accounts of 
recently conducted empirical research.94  There also is some evidence that 
disclosure of conflicts of interest may actually encourage potential subjects to 
agree to participate in a study.  In Dr. Grady’s study, for example, one of the 
subjects observed that knowledge of a patent interest would be a positive factor 
in encouraging the researcher to be accurate with study data: “that [consulting] 
would make me think, oh, he’s really on board with this . . . it would be a 
positive . . . [and] make me a little more [interested in participating].”95  One of 
the other studies concluded that participants to whom financial interests were 
disclosed, believed the researcher would “do a better job,” and would not “cut 
corners or try to do it the easy way instead of doing it the way it should be 
done.”96  Such financial disclosures were interpreted “as an indication of the 
integrity of the study or researcher. . . . Implicit in many comments was the 
notion that the researcher who discloses a financial interest will be more likely 
to conduct the study in an ethical fashion.”97  One could well imagine potential 
participants, in considering financial conflicts of interest, particularly equity 
interests, going even further and concluding that the researcher must really 
 
“[m]y primary reason that I participate is because of the drug;” and that “[i]f I am ill and he’s 
got a drug that could help me, I don’t care about [the investigator’s financial interests]” 
(emphasis added)). 
 92. See Appelbaum et al., supra note 83, at 21. 
 93. Franklin G. Miller & Howard Brody, What Makes Placebo-Controlled Trials 
Unethical?, 2 AM. J. BIOETHICS 3, 4–5 (2002). 
 94. See generally Weinfurt et al., supra note 66; Weinfurt et al., supra note 51, at 860. 
 95. Grady et al., supra note 69, at 596 (alterations in original). 
 96. Weinfurt, supra note 66, at 903 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 97. Id. at 903. 
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believe in the efficacy of the test article if he or she owns stock in the company 
that manufactures it.98  Another respondent in Dr. Grady’s study, for example, 
commented on the possibility that, as a result of an investigator’s equity 
investment, the investigator might be “afraid he’s going to lose [money], then I 
think he will put his best foot forward to make this a good drug . . . to make 
sure you have the right data on it,” thus making it more likely that the 
participant would join the study.99 
A first cousin to the concept of therapeutic misconception is the concept of 
clinical equipoise.  This generally means that “the various arms of a study not 
only must be in a position of equipoise vis-à-vis one another, but that they also 
be in a position of equipoise with respect to other interventions the subjects 
could receive outside of the study.”100  Therefore, the 2008 revised version of 
the Declaration of Helsinki states: “The benefits, risks, burdens and 
effectiveness of a new intervention must be tested against those of the best 
current proven intervention . . . .”101  Consequently, it could be argued that the 
only time a placebo controlled trial, for example, is appropriate would be when 
no effective treatment exists or when existing treatments are inadequate for the 
patient.102 
As noted, some data suggests that information about conflicts of interest 
presented to potential research participants may increase the likelihood that 
they will participate.  However, the increased willingness to participate may 
well be based on two factors, neither of which may necessarily be true. 
The first is that the researcher’s financial interests suggest that the 
researcher has a strong belief in the test article’s efficacy or greater efficacy 
than other treatment approaches.  But, the potential subjects are not likely to 
understand that this concept of clinical equipoise, so critical to the conduct of 
 
 98. See Grady et al., supra note 69, at 594, 598; see also Hampson et al., supra note 52, at 
2334, 2336 tbl.4 (reporting that the majority of patients believed it was acceptable for researchers 
or the health center where the trial was being conducted to each “own stock in the drug company 
whose drug is being used” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 99. Grady et al., supra note 69, at 595 tbl.3 (second alteration in original). 
 100. COLEMAN ET AL., supra note 17, § 6.02(B)(4), at 262. 
 101. World Med. Ass’n, Declaration of Helsinki: Ethical Principles for Medical Research 
Involving Human Subjects ¶ 32, at 5 (adopted 1964) (2008) [hereinafter Declaration of Helsinki], 
http://www.wma.net/e/policy/pdf/17c.pdf; COLEMAN ET AL., supra note 17, § 6.02(B)(4), at 262 
(providing a similar discussion and analysis of the 2000 revisions to the Declaration of Helsinki). 
 102. See Declaration of Helsinki, supra note 101, ¶ 32, at 5 (“The use of placebo, or no 
treatment, is acceptable in studies where no current proven intervention exists . . . .”); see also 
Trudo Lemmens & Paul B. Miller, Avoiding a Jekyll-and-Hyde Approach to the Ethics of Clinical 
Research and Practice, 2 AM. J. BIOETHICS 14 (2002) (discussing the ethical tension inherent in 
the use of placebo controls when the clinical researcher is bound by conflicting moral 
commitments—the researcher to research itself and the medical clinician to upholding the duty of 
care). 
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research, cuts precisely against any such notion.103  By its very definition, the 
concept of clinical equipoise requires that the researcher believe that the test 
article is, in fact, not more likely to be a better alternative.104 
The second possibility that emerges from the fact that disclosure may 
actually increase willingness to participate, may well be based on the potential 
subject’s idea that the mere fact that the disclosure was made serves to 
significantly increase his or her level of trust in the researcher.  Yet, the 
disclosure may well have been required of the researcher by third parties such 
as conflict of interests committees or IRBs and over the strong objection of the 
researcher. 
Moreover, other psychological factors may well undermine the 
effectiveness of disclosure as a remedy for problems caused by conflicts of 
interest.  A number of investigators conducted a study of the “perverse effects” 
of disclosing conflicts of interest.105  The study design did not involve 
healthcare.106  Instead, it required individuals, or “estimators,” to estimate the 
value of coins in several jars and paid them according to the accuracy of their 
estimates.107  Some information was provided to the estimators by “advisors,” 
(who were also study participants), but the advisors were paid, depending on 
the experimental condition, on the basis of either how accurate or how high 
(relative to actual values) the estimators’ estimates were.108  Advisors carefully 
examined the jars and wrote reports containing their suggestions of the value 
of the jar in question, which were then shared with the estimators.109  In the 
condition where both estimators and advisors would be paid based on the 
estimator’s accuracy, this fact was prominently noted in the advisor’s report to 
the estimators.110  In the other condition, where payment to advisors would be 
based on how high the estimators’ estimate was, no such information regarding 
the basis of payment was provided to the estimator in the advisor’s report.111  
Before making an estimate, estimators could only briefly look at the jars, 
which were placed some distance from where they sat.112 
The analogy to conflicts of interest in a research protocol is apparent.  The 
estimators are the potential research participants, the advisors are the 
investigators, and the information provided by advisors to estimators is akin to 
 
 103. See Lemmens & Miller, supra note 102, at 15–16. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Daylian M. Cain et al., The Dirt on Coming Clean: Perverse Effects of Disclosing 
Conflicts of Interest, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 20 (2005). 
 106. Id. at 9. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 8. 
 109. Id. at 9. 
 110. Cain et al., supra note 105, at 10. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at 9–10. 
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that in a consent document or discussion between research participants and 
investigators.  Such information, of course, in the human research context, 
would include information about conflicts of interest. 
The results of the study indicated that there was a general tendency to 
underestimate jar values when incentives were aligned (i.e., both would be 
paid on the basis of the accuracy of the estimator’s report), but where the 
advisor’s reward would be based on how high the estimator’s stated valuations 
were, there was a clear tendency on the part of advisors to exaggerate jar 
values.113  The authors concluded that “[a] superficial analysis of disclosure 
helps to explain the popularity of this purported remedy for conflicts of 
interest: all parties appear to benefit.”114  But, the “more complex analysis” 
questions this conclusion, and it indicates that the providers of information 
benefited the advisors but not the estimators, thereby challenging “the belief 
that disclosure is a reliable and effective remedy for the problems caused by 
conflicts of interest.”115 
The authors suggest that disclosure can fail because “(1) disclosure gives 
advisors strategic reason and moral license to further exaggerate their advice” 
(for our purposes, be it in a consent document or in the one-on-one discussion 
between the patient and the researcher regarding participation in the study), 
and “(2) [disclosure] may not lead to sufficient discounting to counteract this 
effect.”116  That is, people generally do not discount advice from biased 
advisors as much as they should because disclosure may increase trust.  This 
might well occur when advisors’ (or researchers’) conflicts of interest are 
disclosed.117  Moreover, disclosure can actually increase the bias in advice 
because it “leads advisors to feel morally licensed and strategically encouraged 
to exaggerate their advice even further. . . . [D]isclosure may fail to solve the 
problems created by conflicts of interest and may sometimes even make 
matters worse.”118  As one of the studies noted above suggests, for example, 
knowledge of a researcher’s investment in a company sponsoring the study, or 
the researcher’s affiliation as a consultant to the company, only serves to 
promote confidence that the test article or drug is likely to improve the study 
participant’s condition.119 
 
 113. Id. at 12–14. 
 114. Id. at 18. 
 115. Cain et al., supra note 105, at 20. 
 116. Id. at 22. 
 117. Id. at 6. 
 118. Id. at 1, 22. 
 119. See supra text accompanying notes 93–99. 
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III.  RESEARCH SCANDALS 
Several prominent research scandals involving conflicts of interest, a 
number of which are particularly infamous, began to surface in 1998.120  
Among the more notable situations are those described in Moore v. Regents of 
the University of California,121 as well as the facts surrounding the story of the 
death of Jesse Gelsinger in 1999,122 and the events at the Fred Hutchinson 
Cancer Research Center in 2001.123  Newer ones, such as the PRODISC 
clinical trial in 2008, are disclosed with some frequency.124 
Recently, four of the largest manufacturers of artificial joints paid a total of 
$310 million in penalties to settle federal accusations that they used fake 
consulting agreements and other means to persuade surgeons to use their 
products.125  Researchers at NIH accepted hundreds of thousands of dollars in 
consulting fees, failing to inform agency officials, with “NIH doctors [seeing] 
requirements to disclose outside consulting as ‘basically a bureaucratic 
nuisance.’”126  Lately, there has been a spate of disclosures regarding 
previously unidentified earnings by academic researchers from study sponsors.  
Many of these came to light in response to congressional demands that the 
sponsors produce lists of actual payments made.  These responses indicated 
significant payments to researchers who failed to report such payments to their 
own institutional officials when they had been required to do so.127 
 
 120. See generally COLEMAN ET AL., supra note 17, § 2.01, at 57–61; Goldner, supra note 36, 
at 379, 382, 389. 
 121. 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990).  In 1999, the California Supreme Court held that a treating 
physician developing a cell line from the blood of a patient was required to tell the patient of the 
physician’s personal interests that may affect his professional judgment.  Id. at 484–85.  The court 
found that the physician’s failure to do so could render him liable for malpractice based on breach 
of informed consent.  Id. 
 122. See Goldner, supra note 36, at 379–80 (describing the death of an eighteen-year-old in a 
gene therapy trial in which the lead scientist had a financial interest in a positive trial outcome). 
 123. Duff Wilson et al., Congress Takes on Medical-Trials Controversy, SEATTLE TIMES, 
May 30, 2001, at A1 (reporting that 80 out of 82 subjects died in a clinical trial in which three 
lead researchers and a Hutch-affiliated foundation held stock in a firm that held the commercial 
rights to some of the drugs tested); see also COLEMAN ET AL., supra note 17, § 5.01, at 207, 225. 
 124. Reed Abelson, Financial Ties Cited as Issue in Spine Study, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2008, 
at A1 (noting doctors at approximately half of the seventeen research centers involved in the 
study stood to profit financially if the device was successful). 
 125. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Five Companies in Hip and Knee Replacement 
Industry Avoid Prosecution by Agreeing to Compliance Rules and Monitoring (Sept. 27, 2007), 
available at  http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/nj/press/files/pdffiles/hips0927.rel.pdf. 
 126. Rick Weiss, ‘Serious Misconduct’ by NIH Expert Found, WASH. POST, June 14, 2006, at 
A6. 
 127. Gardiner Harris & Benedict Carey, Researchers Fail to Reveal Full Drug Pay, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 8, 2008, at A1; see also Gardiner Harris, Top Psychiatrist Didn’t Report Drug 
Makers’ Pay, Files Show, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2008, at A1. 
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The public has only recently learned that Dr. Charles B. Nemeroff, the 
chairman of the psychiatry department at Emory University, apparently 
violated both University rules and federal reporting regulations when he told 
the institution’s administrators that he would earn under $10,000 in consulting 
fees in 2004 from any single drug manufacturer.128  In fact, congressional 
investigators learned that Nemeroff had already earned in excess of $98,000 
from a sponsor at the time of the disclosure, and the sponsor paid him a total of 
$170,000 that year.129  In both 2005 and 2006, Nemeroff also greatly exceeded 
the federal regulations’ $10,000 threshold from any one source such that 
reporting is required.130  From 2000 through 2006, Nemeroff earned $960,000 
from one sponsor alone, but he declared less than $35,000 on his disclosure 
forms.131  In fact, he earned a total of $2.8 million from sponsors between 2000 
and 2007 and failed to disclose $1.2 million of it.132  In response, he claimed 
that “to the best of my knowledge, I have followed the appropriate university 
regulations concerning financial disclosures.”133 
Between 2003 and 2006, Nemeroff was the principal investigator on a $3.9 
million NIH study.134  Had Emory known about his higher income, the 
University would have been required to inform NIH of his potential conflict or 
remove him as principal investigator.135 
The federal government froze funds for his then current $9.3 million 
project and now requires more of Emory in the way of checks and 
documentation on researchers’ outside activities and potential conflicts of 
interest before awarding any additional funding.136  After the congressional 
investigation became public, Nemeroff voluntarily resigned his department 
chairmanship on a temporary basis.137 
Internal Emory documents indicated that on a number of prior occasions 
the University questioned Nemeroff’s outside activities and relationships with 
drug companies.138  In 2004, for example, there was a similar investigation of 
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Nemeroff’s consulting relationships with outside companies.139  The 
University’s conflict of interest committee identified multiple “serious” and 
“significant” violations of University procedures that were intended to protect 
patients.140  The New York Times concluded that “the university apparently 
took little action against Dr. Nemeroff and made no effort to independently 
audit his consulting income.”141  Moreover, the Times noted that in conjunction 
with a 2000 investigation, Nemeroff wrote a letter to the University that 
explicitly noted his membership on some dozen corporate advisory boards, 
pointing out that one company donated an endowed chair and another was 
likely to do so.142  The letter further observed that one funded a career 
development award in the department and two others had been asked to do 
so.143  Thus, part of the University administration’s lack of response could well 
be that it had its own conflicts of interest and stood to gain mightily by these 
kinds of corporate relationships.  The entire attitude regarding these conflicts 
could also be explained by an unusually minimalistic attitude of federal 
agencies, research institutions, and professional organizations toward 
regulating conflicts of interest in research.144 
Two critical facts emerge from these examples.  First, in some of these 
instances research participants were injured, at least indirectly, but perhaps 
directly, as a result of the intervention.  Second, these scandals damaged public 
support for the research enterprise.145 
IV.  EXISTING CONFLICT OF INTEREST REGULATIONS 
Several empirical studies demonstrate clinical researchers’ lack of 
knowledge of conflict of interest issues and guidelines,146 inaccurate reporting 
of financial conflicts,147 and the very limited extent to which institutions 
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engage in effective management of conflicts and practically never penalize 
violations of disclosure requirements.148  As Senator Charles E. Grassley (R-
Iowa), who has been leading the congressional inquiry into these unreported or 
underreported conflicts of interest, commented, “[a]fter questioning about 20 
doctors and research institutions, it looks like problems with transparency are 
everywhere . . . . The current system for tracking financial relationships isn’t 
working.”149  After reviewing the results of the congressional investigation, the 
Times article concluded: “The findings suggest that universities are all but 
incapable of policing their faculty’s conflicts of interest.  Almost every major 
medical school and medical society is now reassessing its relationships with 
drug and device makers.”150  The existing world of regulation of conflicts of 
interest in research is woefully inadequate.151 
A. Federal Regulations and Guidance 
At the federal level,152 the only formal regulations adopted through the 
notice-and-comment rulemaking process come from the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA)153 and the Public Health Service (PHS).154  There is a 
reporting “policy” for the National Science Foundation (NSF) that was not 
subject to the notice-and-comment rulemaking process.155  But the rules for 
NSF are practically identical to those for the PHS.  Federal regulations to 
protect human subjects apply to research funded by the seventeen government 
agencies that have adopted the “Common Rule,”156 and to research seeking 
FDA approval of drugs, biological agents, or devices.157 
Health and Human Services (HHS) regulations158 apply to research 
involving human subjects conducted by HHS or to research that is funded in 
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whole or in part by HHS.159  But these regulations, as noted earlier, do not 
address in any direct way the issue of conflicts of interest.160  FDA regulations 
pertaining to human subjects research apply to research involving products 
regulated by the FDA.161  One portion of the FDA regulations essentially 
mirrors these HHS regulations, but again, the federal support is not necessary 
for the FDA regulations to be applicable.162  When research involving products 
regulated by the FDA is funded, supported, or conducted by the FDA and/or 
HHS, both the HHS and FDA regulations apply.163 
FDA regulations are relatively narrow in scope.  They are directed at study 
sponsors, such as pharmaceutical and device manufacturers, at the time that 
there is a submission of clinical data to support claims of safety and 
effectiveness of products that the agency regulates.164  The agency’s principal 
concern is whether such financial relationships might jeopardize the reliability 
of the data submitted.165  Specifically, what must be disclosed are “significant 
payments of other sorts” from the sponsor of over $25,000 in payments beyond 
the costs of the study while the study is being carried out and for one year 
thereafter.166  In addition, the sponsor must disclose any significant equity 
interests held by the investigator in the sponsor, which is defined as any equity 
of a privately held entity or over $50,000 in a public company.167 
Further, prior to an investigator becoming involved in a study, the sponsor 
of a “covered clinical study”168 that is the basis of an Investigational New Drug 
(IND) or Investigational Device Exemption application, must obtain financial 
information before the study begins so as to possess the data that will be 
required when applying to market the test article.169  There is no requirement 
that the FDA, the sponsor of the study, or the institution where the study is 
being conducted review the financial data, disclose the data to study 
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participants, or otherwise put in place a management plan while the study is 
being conducted.  The only possible implication of such financial conflicts of 
interest is the remote possibility that the FDA might ultimately refuse to allow 
the test device to be marketed, based on its conclusion that the data was 
unreliable due to the conflicts.170 
For the PHS, which includes NIH and the Small Business Innovation 
Research Program, the arrangement is significantly different.  To apply for a 
grant the institution has to certify that it enforces a written institutional conflict 
of interest policy.171  The policy must require that investigators disclose known 
“Significant Financial Interests,” which would “reasonably appear to be 
affected by the research,” to the institution’s “designated official.”172  The 
designated official could be an individual or something like a conflict of 
interest committee.  Here, the term Significant Financial Interest means “salary 
or other payments for services (e.g., consulting fees or honoraria); equity 
interests (e.g., stocks, stock options or other ownership interests); and 
intellectual property rights (e.g., patents, copyrights and royalties from such 
rights),” in excess of $10,000 in value, more than a five percent ownership 
interest in a single entity, or similar interests expected to exceed $10,000 
during the next twelve-month period.173 
The institution itself does not need to further disclose any details regarding 
the conflict of interest, unless it is unable to “manage, reduce or eliminate” the 
conflict.174  While the PHS agency does not define “manage, reduce or 
eliminate,” the rules provide some examples of conditions or restrictions that 
the institution may impose to do so.175  These include: “[p]ublic disclosure of 
significant financial interests; [m]onitoring of the research by independent 
reviewers; [m]odification of the research plan; [d]isqualification from 
participation in all or a portion of the research funded by the [agency]; 
[d]ivestiture of significant financial interests; or [s]everance of relationships 
that create actual or potential conflicts.”176  If an institution determines that the 
investigator’s failure to comply with its conflicts of interest policy resulted in a 
“biased design, conduct, or reporting of the PHS-funded research,” it is to 
notify the awarding agency of “the corrective action taken or to be taken.”177  
The agency will then “consider the situation and, as necessary, [either] take 
appropriate action [itself], or refer the matter [back] to the Institution for 
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further action,” including directing the institution on “how to maintain 
appropriate objectivity in the funded project.”178  The agency has a variety of 
other remedies, including the suspension of funding.179  Still, there are no other 
specific standards in place to guide institutional behavior.180  There are no 
limitations, per se, on dollar amounts that may be received, or on the maximum 
amount of percentage of equity interests that an investigator may hold.  The 
government simply delegates responsibility to the institution which, itself, may 
have a conflict of interest in the research being conducted, or in maintaining 
the goodwill of an employee who brings significant resources to the 
institution.181  There is no requirement of disclosure to potential research 
participants. 
The Office of Human Research Protections (OHRP), the enforcement 
agency for regulations regarding the treatment of human subjects, provides 
investigators with a “guidance document” (notably not a regulation) which 
raises “points to consider” regarding financial relationships.182  OHRP’s 
“points to consider” include “suggesting” (1) the possible establishment of 
conflict of interest committees, (2) the need for potential management of 
conflicts of interest by the institution, and (3) the determination of whether 
particular individuals should report financial interest to such a committee.183 
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B. Private Organization Policies 
In February 2008, the Association of American Medical Colleges (AAMC) 
and the Association of American Universities (AAU) together issued a helpful 
report, directed at institutions, which advocated the adoption of more 
consistent policies and practices in implementing comprehensive conflicts of 
interest programs.184  Among the recommendations are ones to require the 
broadening of the definition of “covered individual” beyond the principal 
investigator, so as to include others who share responsibility for designing, 
conducting, or reporting of funded research and to the spouses and dependent 
children of each of these individuals.185  In addition, the report recommends 
more carefully defining the “compelling circumstances” that would overcome 
AAMC’s earlier policy recommendation that required a rebuttable presumption 
against participation in research by conflicted investigators.186  The purpose of 
enumerating compelling circumstances would be to define the stages of 
research and the specific activities for which there are compelling reasons to 
permit the conflicted researcher to be involved, and to structure and approve a 
management plan that would clearly restrict the investigator in accordance 
with a pre-determined policy.187 
In addition, the report argues in favor of the notion that the reporting 
requirement pertaining to outside financial interests related to professional 
responsibilities should be extended to eliminate any de minimis threshold, even 
if, for example, the PHS $10,000 line might still be used to define what is a 
“Significant Financial Interest” that would trigger the rebuttable presumption 
of non-participation.188  It also notes that institutions might want to exempt 
certain kinds of income, such as well-defined types of consulting fees, 
honoraria for academic activities, and the like.189  On the other hand, the report 
recommends that institutions make clear that reporting is required for all 
outside financial interests, directly or indirectly related to their professional 
responsibilities, irrespective of whether the individual believes that such 
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interests might reasonably be affected by present or anticipated future 
research.190  It specifically addresses instances involving pre-clinical research 
and suggests the disclosures should indicate if the research linked to the 
financial interest is “reasonably anticipated” either to be a component of a 
submission for an IND or to progress to research involving human subjects 
within the next twelve months.191  If so, the conflict of interest committee 
should determine if management plan types of stipulations should be applied to 
the pre-clinical stage of the research.192 
The report also recommends broadening the scope of disclosure of 
managed conflicts, both within and outside of the institution, so as to include 
within the scope of the individuals or organizations with which the disclosure 
is to be shared, among others: all researchers, students, and trainees working 
on the project; editors of publications to which a manuscript is submitted; and 
oral or written public communication of research results.193  It also makes 
recommendations regarding institutional conflicts of interest and on the 
implementation of conflicts of interest policies.194 
Several other groups have promulgated other voluntary guidelines 
regarding conflicts of interest in human subjects research.195  For the most part, 
these guidelines have received less attention among academic institutions and 
in literature. 
C. Institutional Policies 
Institutional conflict of interest policies are all over the board, as empirical 
research has noted.196  They differ in the amount of a financial interest that 
would constitute a Significant Financial Interest with 68% of the 101 
institution cohorts in the study using the PHS standard of $10,000, 27% using a 
lower dollar amount, and one using the $25,000 FDA limit.197  Sixty-one 
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percent include equity in companies that are not publicly traded regardless of 
the percentage share of equity, and 64% include equity in such companies 
regardless of estimations of value.198  Thirty-eight percent include royalty 
income above a certain threshold, while 33% include it regardless of amount, 
and 64% include non-royalty payments not directly related to reasonable costs 
of research.199  Eighty-one percent allow a researcher with a Significant 
Financial Interest to conduct human research in compelling circumstances.200  
While 76% had established conflict of interest committees, merely 21% had 
members from outside the institution serving on those committees.201  
Institutions varied widely on how royalty rights would be shared, and there 
was a variety of approaches used to review such agreements, specifically on 
the issue of whether the researchers (and perhaps their institutions) might be 
prohibited from being involved in future research on the technology that used 
human subjects.202  In addition, the study indicated a broad range of 
management techniques addressed in the policies.203 
V.  RESEARCHER PARADIGMS 
Resistance to conflict of interest management plans generally stems from 
the wide variety of attitudes held by researchers toward the entire issue of 
conflicts of interest.  Such resistance can range from what would appear to be 
outright lying on conflict of interest reports to the institution, such as that 
which appears in the case of Dr. Nemeroff from Emory discussed above,204 to 
less troubling, yet nonetheless frustrating (at least to members of conflict of 
interest committees), forms of resistance to the process and to proposed 
management plans.  One question that arises, but that may help provide some 
guidance on how to go about remedying the situation, pertains to what 
motivates researchers to take such an approach.  My own experience on such a 
committee, and discussions with committee members at various institutions, 
has led me to develop a taxonomy of categories into which most researchers 
fall: (1) The Ideologue, (2) The Wild-Eyed Scientist-as-Hero, (3) The 
Entrepreneur, (4) The Naïve Careerist, and (5) The Legalist. 
A. The Ideologue 
The Ideologue approaches conflicts of interest from laissez-faire economic 
perspectives and espouses the view of non-intervention, particularly in 
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commercial ventures, by the government, by the institution, or by both.  The 
Ideologue favors self-interest, competition, and natural consumer (i.e., research 
participants’) preferences as forces leading to optimal prosperity and freedom.  
She possesses a firm belief that the natural economic order, untouched by 
regulations or adjustments, was designed to produce maximum well-being for 
all.  The Ideologue’s emphasis stems from the profit motive and from an 
unyielding resolve that individual initiative, and only that, will make for 
economic progress.  Perhaps, as a scientist, the Ideologue might be forced to 
concede the need for minimal regulation, but only if hard, irrefutable, 
empirical data establishes that such regulation is needed—maybe not even 
then! 
B. The Entrepreneur 
The Entrepreneur focuses on initiating, or perhaps partially financing (if he 
is able) new commercial enterprises, in large part to increase his own assets or 
perhaps those of members of his family.  He generally believes that he has a 
right to act in an unrestrained fashion and may be adept at developing facile 
arguments that enable him to avoid or even evade generally applicable rules.  
He differs from the Ideologue in that there are no serious philosophical 
premises to his position. 
C. The Wild-Eyed Scientist-as-Hero 
The Wild-Eyed Scientist-as-Hero believes that if left unfettered he will 
cure diabetes, cancer, etc.  His view is that no kind of interference (i.e., 
regulations) can appropriately be placed in his path.  The end really does 
justify the means. 
D. The Naïve Careerist 
The Naïve Careerist’s behavior is such that she single-mindedly fights 
regulatory efforts on a number of grounds.  She perceives herself as an 
extremely ethical individual.  She takes umbrage at any thought that she would 
ruin her reputation as a competent, ethical researcher and clinician by having 
what others perceive to be conflicts of interest that either (1) adversely affect 
her patients who participate in research, or (2) that would lead her to 
manipulate research data to positively influence the research outcome.  Often 
the nature of the conflict is such that she can readily align her own pecuniary 
interest with that of her employer.  Consequently, she can also justify resisting 
the effort to deal with a conflict of interest on the basis that it will positively 
influence not only her own bottom line but also that of the institution.  She just 
wants to be a good citizen.  If in an academic setting, she may perceive her SFI 
as helping to make up for financial sacrifices that she has made in choosing to 
enter academia. 
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E. The Legalist 
This type of researcher is readily willing to follow the rules once he is 
made aware of them.  The vast majority of researchers who have conflicts of 
interest fall under this category.  They want to know what is required of them, 
and they generally respond properly without issue. 
VI.  MANAGING CONFLICTS OF INTEREST 
Most discussions of conflict of interest management begin with compelled 
disclosure to at least the institution where the research is being conducted 
and/or where the researcher has his or her principal ties.205  What kinds of 
conflicts and the amounts below which disclosures need not be made varies on 
a case-by-case basis.206  Other management strategies include, but are not 
limited to, divestiture of part or all of equity interests, modification of research 
plans, prohibition of participation in all or certain aspects of the research, and 
limitations or prohibitions of activities not involving equity interests.  Non-
equity interest limitations could include consulting or engaging in certain 
educational activities of the research sponsoring entity and/or not serving in 
certain positions within the sponsoring entity.  Similarly, where the researcher 
has administrative responsibilities within the institution, such as chairing a 
department or division, limits may be placed on his or her activities in those 
capacities.  Thus for example, the researcher might be prohibited from or 
limited in passing upon applications for promotion and tenure or annual 
evaluations, where individuals under the researcher’s supervision, be they 
faculty members, staff, or students, might also be engaged in the research.  
Where the conflict involves issues such as the physical location where the 
research is being conducted (for example, using institutional space or 
equipment for a “start-up” entity),207 a plan that includes fair market rental 
payments to the institution by the researcher or the entity in which he or she 
holds an equity interest may be required.  In addition, where such start-up 
entities are involved, it may well be necessary to develop a timetable for 
moving the research outside the institution. 
Even in the absence of a specific federal mandate, most research 
institutions have established and maintain conflict of interest committees that 
identify and attempt to manage conflicts of interest.208  Often committee 
members will assist researchers in negotiating the terms of such a management 
plan.  Several studies suggest, however, that the lack of uniform conflict of 
 
 205. See Barnes & Florencio, supra note 152, at 544. 
 206. Id. 
 207. See id. at 526. 
 208. PHS and NSF require that research institutions “report the existence of conflicts of 
interest to the funding agency but allow the institutions to manage conflicts internally.  The 
regulations do not specify how to do so.”  McCrary et al., supra note 136, at 1621, 1624–25. 
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interest policies and the lack of clarity in those that do exist, allow many 
financial conflicts of interest to go undetected and unmanaged, or inadequately 
managed.209  Another study reports that the manner in which an institution 
actually manages conflicts of interest in research often is not consistent with its 
written policies.210 
In January 2008, the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of 
Health and Human Services issued in a report titled “National Institutes of 
Health: Conflicts of Interest in Extramural Research.”211  The report, based 
upon empirical data collected by the HHS-OIG, highlighted several areas 
where it believes that the NIH’s oversight of grantee institutions’ financial 
conflicts of interest is insufficient.  Specifically, the OIG noted that “NIH 
could not provide an accurate count of financial conflict-of-interest reports,”212 
that “NIH is not aware of the types of financial conflicts of interest that exist 
within grantee institutions,”213 and that “[m]any NIH Institutes’ primary 
method of oversight is reliance on grantee institutions’ assurances that 
financial conflicts-of-interest regulations are followed.”214 
 
 209. See id.; see also Elizabeth A. Boyd et al., Implementation of Financial Disclosure 
Policies to Manage Conflicts of Interest, 23 HEALTH AFF. 206, 213 (2004) (“In the absence of a 
clear and consistent definition of conflict of interest, individual committees have developed their 
own sets of standards in evaluating financial disclosures.  Those standards appear to be based on 
specific institutional values that the committees felt were important to protect.”); Mildred K. Cho 
et al., Policies on Faculty Conflicts of Interest at US Universities, 284 JAMA 2203, 2208 (2000) 
(“Most policies on conflict of interest at major US research institutions lack specificity about the 
kinds of relationships with industry that are permitted or prohibited.”); Elizabeth A. Boyd & Lisa 
A. Bero, Improving the Use of Research Evidence in Guideline Development: 4 Managing 
Conflicts of Interest, 4 HEALTH RES. POL’Y & SYS. 16 (2006), http://www.health-policy-
systems.com/content/4/1/16 (“We recommend the development of specific, detailed, structured 
forms that solicit as much information as possible about the nature and extent of the competing 
interests.”). 
 210. Recent empirical studies have not addressed this issue directly.  For the most current 
discussion of the topic, see Michaela A. Dinan et. al., Comparison of Conflict of Interest Policies 
and Reported Practices in Academic Medical Centers in the United States, 13 ACCOUNTABILITY 
RES. 325, 338, finding that in a study of 123 U.S. academic medical institutions with internal 
IRBs, “in the absence of explicit language in formal policies, oversight officials did not always 
agree about the actual practices of the institution.” 
 211. DEP’T HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., NATIONAL 
INSTITUTES OF HEALTH: CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN EXTRAMURAL RESEARCH (2008) 
[hereinafter OIG, NIH: CONFLICTS OF INTEREST], available at http://www.oig.hhs.gov/oei/ 
reports/oei-03-06-00460.pdf. 
 212. Id. at 9. 
 213. Id. at 11. 
 214. Id. at 13. 
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Although under the applicable federal regulations some investigators must 
report financial conflicts of interest, this information is self-reported.215  In 
particular, the OIG reported that because conflict of interest reports are not 
required to detail the nature of the conflict, NIH is not aware of the types of 
conflicts of interest that exist in grantee institutions.216  Further, “[t]he majority 
of the Institutes do not have any proactive methods to ensure that grantees have 
financial conflict-of-interest policies,” and as a result the Institutes must rely 
solely on assertions by grantee institutions that they are properly managing 
financial conflicts of interests that exist in their research endeavors.217  The 
OIG also found that systems tracking financial conflicts of interest are 
inadequate or do not exist at all, making it virtually impossible for the 
Institutes to follow up on identified conflicts of interest.218 
Based upon these insufficiencies the OIG recommended that the NIH 
“increase oversight of grantee institutions to ensure their compliance with 
federal financial conflict-of-interest regulations,” that it “require grantee 
institutions to provide details regarding the nature of financial conflicts of 
interest and how they are managed, reduced, or eliminated”, and that it 
“require institutes to forward to [the Office of Extramural Research (OER)] all 
financial conflict-of-interest reports that they receive from grantee institutions 
and ensure that OER’s conflict of interest database contains information on all 
conflict-of-interest reports provided by grantee institutions.”219 
In 2009 the OIG of HHS issued another report, entitled “The Food and 
Drug Administration’s Oversight of Clinical Investigators’ Financial 
Information.”220  The purpose of the this report was “[t]o describe the extent 
and nature of clinical investigators’ disclosed financial interests reported to the 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) for marketing applications approved in 
fiscal year (FY) 2007,” and “[t]o assess FDA’s oversight of clinical 
investigators’ financial information.”221  The report does not assess problems 
involving individual researchers or institutional failures in the area of conflicts 
of interest, but rather those of the FDA itself in tracking potential conflicts 
with respect to applications by sponsors for authority to market test articles.  
 
 215. Nat’l Inst. of Allergy & Infectious Diseases, NIH, Financial Conflicts of Interest for 
Awardee: Standard Operating Procedure, http://www.niaid.nih.gov/ncn/sop/fcoi.htm (last visited 
July 30, 2009). 
 216. OIG, NIH: CONFLICTS OF INTEREST, supra note 211, at 11. 
 217. Id. at 13. 
 218. Id. at 11. 
 219. Id. at 16–17. 
 220. See DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., THE FOOD AND 
DRUG ADMINISTRATION’S OVERSIGHT OF CLINICAL INVESTIGATORS’ FINANCIAL INFORMATION 
(2009) [hereinafter OIG, FDA REPORT], available at http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-05-07-00 
730.pdf. 
 221. Id. at i. 
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The report, nonetheless, is quite instructive for present purposes regarding the 
need for an expanded role for both the federal government and for institutions 
in regulating conflicts.  The report points to inconsistency and a lack of 
uniformity of process as underlying reasons why (a) 42% of marketing 
applications had missing financial information, (b) no documentation of review 
of financial interests existed for 31% of marketing applications, and (c) “[i]n 
20 [%] of marketing applications, FDA reviewers did not take action and 
sponsors did not indicate that they minimized potential bias during the clinical 
trials.”222  The OIG found that “FDA cannot determine whether sponsors have 
submitted financial information for all clinical investigators because FDA does 
not have a complete list of clinical investigators,” nor does the agency use on-
site inspections to confirm that the financial information submitted in the study 
is complete.223  This certainly indicates that serious concerns about conflicts of 
interest exist regarding procedures in the government agency whose mission is 
to protect the public from drugs and devices, the testing of which needs to be 
beyond reproach. 
The OIG recommended that the FDA take a more active role to ensure that 
“sponsors submit complete financial information for all clinical 
investigators.”224  Specifically, the OIG suggested that the FDA include a 
requirement that sponsors submit researchers’ financial conflict of interest 
information as part of the agency’s already existing pre-trial application 
process.225  The report noted that if the FDA “received financial information 
before clinical trials, [it] could ensure that sponsors are collecting financial 
information before trials and are taking action to ensure that disclosed financial 
interests do not threaten human subjects or compromise data integrity.”226  To 
achieve similar goals at an institutional level, new federal regulations are 
needed that would vest conflict of interest committees with the ability to be 
more active in conflict of interest management.  One possible approach would 
be to require that such a committee approve the conflict of interest 
management plan for a research protocol before the protocol is even sent to an 
IRB.227 
 
 222. Id. at ii. 
 223. Id. at ii, 15. 
 224. Id. at 23. 
 225. OIG, FDA REPORT, supra note 220, at 25. 
 226. Id. 
 227. Similarly, IRBs should have “look back” authority to review the findings and decisions 
of the conflict of interest committee.  See id. at 3.  Presumably, for example, if an IRB is not 
satisfied with a particular management plan, it should have the authority to refuse to approve the 
research.  It could require additional management techniques should it determine that, given the 
nature of a particular protocol, the plan worked out by the conflict of interest committee and the 
investigator insufficiently protected the rights of research participants.  This might, on very rare 
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In response to the significant public attention being paid to conflicts of 
interest concerns over the past few years, as noted above, a variety of “trade 
associations” have developed suggested voluntary guidelines for regulating 
conflicts of interest.228  Apart from the various substantive inadequacies 
presented by these proposals, a key difficulty simply is that they are 
“voluntary,” with no or very limited enforcement mechanisms. 229  Thus, would 
a pharmaceutical company be drummed out of the Pharmaceutical Researcher 
and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) should it fail to adopt or enforce a 
suggested restriction?  Likewise, would a university be banned from 
membership in the AAMC or AAU or from participation in those associations’ 
activities for similar failures?  At least one relatively small “trade association,” 
the North American Spine Society (NASS), has developed disclosure 
requirements with a bit more teeth, but only in connection with participation in 
the Society’s activities, and without addressing other potential management 
techniques.230 
As an historical matter, disclosure has been the primary and sometimes 
sole vehicle used to manage conflicts of interest.  The resolution of dilemmas 
regarding disclosure also continues to plague those who write about the issue 
in the context of publication requirements.231  Some of the very same questions 
arise in connection with disclosure of conflicts of interest to conflict of interest 
committees and to potential research subjects.  Ongoing concerns include when 
disclosures should be made, what level of financial interest should be 
disclosed, what period of time should be covered by the disclosure, who should 
the disclosure cover, and once the conflict is identified, how it should be 
managed? 
 
occasions, necessitate holding a joint meeting of the two committees to arrive at a consensus 
approach. 
 228. See supra text accompanying note 195. 
 229. See, e.g., AAMC-AAU, PROTECTING PATIENTS, supra note 184, at 4 (describing the 
contents of the report as “guidance” and “recommendations” for member institutions to adopt); 
PHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH & MFRS. OF AM., CODE ON INTERACTIONS WITH HEALTHCARE 
PROFESSIONALS 3 (2008) [hereinafter PHRMA CODE] (introducing its “updated and enhanced 
voluntary Code on relationships with U.S. healthcare professionals”). 
 230. “This disclosure policy applies to all participants in all NASS activities, including those 
who serve in committee and leadership positions within the society, speakers, and authors on 
NASS publications, including but not limited to The Spine Journal (TSJ), SpineLine, 
Contemporary Concepts and Clinical Guidelines.” N. Am. Spine Soc’y, NASS Disclosure Policy, 
http://www.spine.org/Pages/PracticePolicy/EthicsProfConduct/NASSDisclosurePolicy.aspx (last 
visited July 30, 2009).  Sanctions for violations under the policy included, but are not limited to, 
“one- or two-year suspensions of membership, membership expulsion, public letters of censure, 
and/or—in conjunction with the Education Council Chairs—barring the member from presenting 
at a specified number of future meetings.”  Id.; see also Thomas M. Burton, Spine Doctors Are 
Adopting Strict Rules on Payments, WALL ST. J., Jan. 24, 2009, at A3. 
 231. See generally Boyd & Bero, supra note 209. 
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More significant is the fact that such disclosure requirements are now 
clearly insufficient even if the questions just raised have been sufficiently 
answered.  As discussed earlier, disclosing conflicts of interest does not 
adequately prevent improper physician behavior that can result from a variety 
of sponsor inducements.232  Before describing a necessary, though many will 
view it as painful, solution to the conflict of interest dilemma, consider the 
following tale. 
For nearly eighteen years I was a member of an IRB that, at that time, 
reviewed biomedical, behavioral, and social science research conducted at a 
large university with an academic medical center.  During the final 
approximately five years (1998 through December 2003) I served as the IRB’s 
chair, resigning that position to assume a visiting professorship opportunity in 
another part of the country.  Nearly at the end of my tenure, I put together a 
small, and what I thought to be adequately diverse and representative, 
subcommittee of the IRB to review the possibility of having it collect 
information and make judgments about researchers’ conflicts (albeit three 
years after I had written an article arguing that this was necessary233).  No such 
review activity on research protocols of any kind was occurring at the 
University at that time.  I thought this subcommittee arrived at a relatively 
benign proposal, which largely involved requiring certain minimum 
disclosures with the possibility of some restrictions on researchers who held 
substantial equity interests in entities for which they were doing research.  The 
proposal was largely based on the earlier issued AAMC report, discussed 
above.234  When the proposal came before the full IRB, it was hit by a large 
chorus of dissenters who ultimately carried the day.  The proposal did not fail 
because of concerns that the IRB already was overburdened.  Rather, it failed 
because of the concern that making our own institutional policies go anywhere 
beyond merely requiring disclosure (either to the IRB or to potential research 
participants), such that a management plan for a conflict or a prohibition on a 
researcher conducting a study might result, would cause researchers to leave 
the institution in droves.  In other words, the fear that won the day was that top 
researchers would simply go elsewhere, where conflict of interest policies 
either did not exist or were far less “intrusive.”  The majority of the IRB 
membership took the position that any such interference with researchers’ 
abilities to conduct their research was unnecessary and unwarranted.  
Consequently, in essence, the IRB should not adopt any policy that would 
require investigators to go beyond the most minimal policy (if any) existing at 
other academic health centers. 
 
 232. See discussion supra Part II.A–B. 
 233. Goldner, supra note 36, at 381–84. 
 234. AAMC, POLICY AND GUIDELINES, supra note 186. 
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The problem is that this “race to the bottom”235 can be stopped only by the 
government imposing the obligation to effectively deal with conflicts on the 
institutions.  What is needed is a uniform set of regulations—yes, a command 
and control approach, albeit administered locally.  This is critically necessary 
to minimize conflict of interest scandals and to restore public confidence in 
research. 
VII.  A PROPOSAL FOR REFORM 
Are attempts to reform how financial conflicts of interests in human 
subjects research are managed doomed to be a Sisyphean struggle?  Certainly 
not if an abolitionist position is adopted for financial conflicts of interest, and 
such a policy is enforced with vigor and with meaningful and appropriately 
severe sanctions for serious violations that would have a significant deterrence 
effect.236  Despite all of the increased attention to such conflicts, as I argued 
some nine years ago,237 I continue to believe that abolition, absent a clear 
federal requirement, is unlikely.  Moreover, such a federally mandated 
abolition flies directly in the face of more than twenty-five years of other clear 
federal policies, such as the entire scheme envisioned by the Bayh-Dole Act, 
designed to foster the very kind of research that often gives rise to such 
potential conflicts.238  Consequently, the likelihood of a federally imposed ban 
 
 235. Cf. Marcia Angell, Former Editor of THE NEW ENG. J. MED., Address at the NIH 
Conference on Human Subject Protection and Financial Conflicts of Interest (Aug. 16, 2000) 
(transcript available at http://hhs.gov/ohrp/coi/8-16.htm) (“[I]nstitutions need to [work together] 
on this issue [of financial conflicts of interest] and develop a common policy.  As it now stands, 
investigators may threaten to leave institutions with stringent policies and go to more lenient 
ones.  That race to the bottom can be stopped only by the major academic medical centers joining 
together to do the right thing.”). 
 236. Institutions rarely prohibit financial conflicts of interest outright.  For example, a 2000 
study analyzing the conflict of interest policies of the ten U.S. medical schools receiving the 
largest amount of research funding from NIH found that one university “prohibited faculty from 
having any financial interests, including stock options, consulting agreements, and decision-
making positions that involved a company sponsoring the study,” that another university 
“prohibited faculty and research staff from trading in stock or stock options in a company 
sponsoring the research or selling the product or device being investigated,” but that policies at 
the other universities in the study generally “stopped short of prohibitions.”  Bernard Lo et al., 
Conflict of Interest Policies for Investigators in Clinical Trials, 343 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1616, 
1618 (2000).  While in the intervening time, given the increased attention to conflict of interest 
issues, many institutions have placed some kinds of limitations on conflicts, there appear to be no 
recent reports of institutions imposing a total ban on them for its researchers, nor have leading 
professional organizations called for such a ban.  See generally AAMC-AAU, PROTECTING 
PATIENTS, supra note 184; INST. OF MED., CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN MEDICAL RESEARCH, 
EDUCATION, AND PRACTICE (2009). 
 237. Goldner, supra note 36. 
 238. 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–212 (2006); see COLEMAN ET AL., supra note 17, § 2.02(c)(1), at 67–
69; supra text accompanying notes 28–31. 
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appears to be nil.  Still, if the research community and the government alike 
are serious about addressing financial conflicts of interest in research, a 
fundamental change in the way conflicts of interest are viewed and ultimately 
managed will be required. 
Thus, I have concluded that the appropriate response to concerns about 
conflicts of interest is to develop new federal conflict of interest regulations 
promulgated through administrative law procedures that involve notice and 
comment.239  The principal advantage of such a new federal regulatory regime 
is that it could be constructed so as to be practically universal in its 
applicability, thus overcoming concerns about the “race to the bottom,” which, 
no doubt, still exists.  To ease implementation, many of the new regulations 
could be modeled after existing IRB regulations under which institutions have 
worked for many years. 
New federal conflict of interest committee regulations should require that 
institutions develop, through an assurance process similar to that established 
for IRBs,240 conflict of interest committees that meet certain membership 
criteria, again similar to those applicable for such boards and including non-
affiliated members.  Federal regulations require that each IRB have “at least 
five members with varying backgrounds to promote complete and adequate 
review of research activities commonly conducted by the institution.”241  The 
regulations further require that each IRB include “at least one member who is 
not otherwise affiliated with the institution.”242  In its February 2008 report, 
AAMC-AAU recommended that an institution’s conflict of interest committee 
 
 239. A movement for uniform national conflict of interest rules is gaining strength.  See, e.g., 
Ted Agres, FASEB: Nationalize Conflict Rules, THE SCIENTIST, July 17, 2007, www.the-
scientist.com/news/display/53381/ (on file with Saint Louis University Law Journal). 
 240. For example, 45 C.F.R. § 46.103(a) (2008), states: “Each institution engaged in research 
which is covered by this policy and which is conducted or supported by a federal department or 
agency shall provide written assurances satisfactory to the department or agency head that it will 
comply with the requirements set forth in this policy.” (emphasis added).  In an earlier article, I 
argued for IRB review of conflicts of interest.  See Goldner, supra note 36.  In the intervening 
years, however, I have become convinced that (a) IRBs already have too much on their plates and 
typically are both understaffed and overworked, and that (b) the level and type of expertise 
required to engage in appropriate regulation of financial conflicts of interest is such that, except at 
institutions engaging in a minimal level of research, it would be wiser to establish a separate body 
that focuses on conflicts of interest alone.  Also, if the research site is not affiliated with an 
institution having such a committee, the site would have to find a duly established conflict of 
interest committee to review and manage any conflicts that are identified.  Finally, any conflict of 
interest committee that is established under such an assurance must have the authority, similar to 
that vested in existing IRBs, see 45 C.F.R. § 46, to delay the initiation of research until the 
committee’s concerns are adequately addressed, and irrespective of the desire of institutional 
officials given the potential for institutional conflicts of interest. 
 241. 45 C.F.R. § 46.107(a). 
 242. Id. § 46.107(d). 
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be composed of at least seven members, “of whom at least two [are] members 
of the public with no active transactional relationships with the institution.”243  
Additionally, AAMC-AAU recommended that “[o]ne of the public members 
should have no institutional affiliation at all.”244  The purpose of a conflict of 
interest committee is to provide an ethical analysis of the effect of a conflict on 
research and the appropriate way to remedy it when necessary.  A majority of 
members without institutional ties would be preferable.245  This is something 
that intelligent lay members of a conflict of interest committee would be 
qualified to do. 
The new regulations should also establish requirements for disclosure of 
all financial conflicts of interest of any amount to the conflict of interest 
committee,246 provide a non-exclusive list of potential management techniques, 
grant the conflict of interest committee the authority to prohibit research from 
commencing or continuing until conflict of interest concerns are resolved,247 
and require that serious or continuing violations are reported to appropriate 
 
 243. AAMC-AAU, PROTECTING PATIENTS, supra note 184, at 39. 
 244. Id. 
 245. In Denmark, for example, it is required by law that there always be one more lay 
member than professional member on IRB or Research Ethical Committees.  Søren Holm, How 
Many Lay Members Can You Have in Your IRB?—An Overview of the Danish System, 14 IRB 8 
(Nov.–Dec. 1992).  A majority of members without institutional ties would be preferable since 
the conflict of interest committee should, ideally, be divorced from institutional politics.  Holm 
notes that “[o]utside observers at committee meetings have found that the most valuable 
contributions are often made by lay members, who often seem better able to spot . . . an 
inappropriate trade off between risks and benefits.”  Id; see also Goldner, supra note 17, at 63, 
107. 
 246. As noted earlier, PHS and NSF require that research institutions report the existence of 
financial conflicts of interest over certain thresholds to the funding agency but allow these 
conflicts to be managed internally.  See supra note 208.  As recommended by the AAMC-AAU, 
financial conflicts of interest of any amount should be reported to the institution, and the PHS de 
minimis thresholds should continue to guide disclosure to the appropriate non-institutional 
entities.  See AAMC-AAU, PROTECTING PATIENTS, supra note 184, at 8 (“The requirement for 
reporting a covered individual’s outside financial interests that are directly or indirectly related to 
professional responsibilities to the institution should be extended to eliminate any de minimis 
threshold. . . . However, the PHS de minimis thresholds may continue to be used to define 
significant financial interest for the purpose of applying the rebuttable presumption against 
participation by a conflicted investigator in human subjects research.”). 
 247. Under 45 C.F.R. § 46.113, IRBs have “the authority to suspend or terminate approval of 
research that is not being conducted in accordance with the IRB’s requirements or that has been 
associated with unexpected serious harm to subjects.”  Conflict of interest committees should 
have the same power to suspend or terminate approval of research where, for example, a 
researcher is non-compliant with a conflict of interest management plan, or where a conflict is so 
egregious as to appear to cause serious harm to the research. 
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governmental agencies.248  Violations of such regulations, that is the failure of 
an institution to deal with conflict of interest concerns appropriately and in 
accordance with the federal guidelines, should result in suspension of federal 
funding of research for some or all projects at the institution.249  Conflict of 
interest committees should be federally mandated to review and approve 
research proposals prior to submission to external funding agencies or, if no 
external funds are involved, then certainly prior to commencement of research.  
Similarly, researchers who fail to report conflicts or who otherwise violate 
conflict of interest regulations should be subject to a range of sanctions, 
including limitations on participation in research projects, debarment from 
receiving federal funding, and other penalties.250 
New federal regulations should also require public disclosure of 
investigator conflicts of interest, both on the NIH-sponsored internet site, 
www.clinicaltrials.gov,251 and in informed consent documents provided to 
participants.  In particular, such a requirement should apply where the conflict 
involves equity interests252 or in other situations where the conflict of interest 
committee determines disclosure to be appropriate. 
Institutions should be required to mandate training of all investigators in 
both the ethical norms that underlie appropriate conflict of interest reporting 
and management prior to the submission of any research protocols for 
institutional approval.  Such educational efforts should include instruction in 
the proper completion of reporting documents. 
To make clear why potential research participants should carefully 
consider the effects of such conflicts of interests on their willingness to 
participate, conflict of interest committees should have the power to require 
descriptions of particular conflicts in the portion of the consent document 
regarding risks of participation; albeit set out in a separate paragraph from 
other types of risks.  This would be in accord with the IRB regulations that 
require informed consent documents to include “[a] description of any 
 
 248. Id. (“Any suspension or termination of approval shall include a statement of the reasons 
for the IRB’s action and shall be reported promptly to the investigator, appropriate institutional 
officials, and the Department or Agency head.”). 
 249. Cf. 45 C.F.R. § 46.123. 
 250. Similar to AAMC-AAU’s recommendations, a presumption of the need for disclosure 
should exist.  For an analogous discussion of sanctions for scientific misconduct, see Goldner, 
supra note 36, at 298–307.  See also supra text accompanying notes 129–41. 
 251. Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-85, § 810, 
121 Stat. 823, 904–22 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 282) (requiring that a “responsible party,” for 
example the sponsor or principal investigator, register and report results of certain “applicable 
clinical trials”); see Protocol Registration System (PRS) and U.S. Public Law 110-85, 
ClinicalTrials.gov, http://prsinfo.clinicaltrials.gov/fdaaa.html (last visited July 30, 2009). 
 252. See supra text accompanying notes 48–99 (discussing potential research participants’ 
particular concerns about researchers’ equity interests versus other types of conflicts). 
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reasonably foreseeable risks or discomforts to the subject.”253  Certainly, 
conflicts of interest have caused a variety of serious problems to research 
subjects; problems that could be characterized as risks or causing 
discomfort.254 
Beyond the baseline federal regulations suggested, research institutions 
should retain the power to develop additional policies that may limit or 
prohibit conflicts of interest so that standards remain “based on specific 
institutional values that the committees [feel are] important to protect.”255  
Existing federal IRB regulations provide a valuable framework for 
restructuring and improving the current conflict of interest committee scheme.  
While few would argue that the IRB regime has been entirely successful, it is 
important to recognize that the perfect is the enemy of the good. 
CONCLUSION 
Financial conflicts of interest are no longer research’s dirty little secret.  
Widespread publicity and several notable research scandals, among other 
factors, have brought this issue to the forefront of discussions of regulatory and 
legislative reform.  In fact, financial conflicts of interest have been tabbed the 
most important issue for medical research in 2009.256  Senator Grassley and 
other lawmakers are actively investigating a variety of individual and 
institutional conflicts of interest in research.257  It would not be surprising if, in 
the near future, prosecutions were brought.  The NIH is in the process of 
revising its external conflict of interest policy and regulations.258  In January 
2009, the OIG concluded that “[f]inancial relationships between researchers 
 
 253. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a)(2). 
 254. See discussion supra Part III; see also Goldner, supra note 237. 
 255. Boyd & Bero, supra note 209, at 2213. 
 256. Conflict of Interest Said Top Issue in 2009, 8 Med. Res. L. & Pol’y Rep. 5 (BNA) (Jan. 
7, 2009). 
 257. Press Release, U.S. Senate Comm. on Fin., Grassley Calls on Congress and NIH Leaders 
to Identify Conflicts of Interest in Taxpayer Sponsored Medical Research (June 25, 2008), 
http://finance.senate.gov/press/Gpress/2008/prg062508CEG%20urges%20NIH.pdf; Press 
Release, IowaPolitics.com, U.S. Sen. Grassley: Grassley, Kohl Continue Campaign to Disclose 
Financial Ties Between Doctors and Drug and Device Companies (Jan. 22, 2009), 
http://www.iowapolitics.com/index.iml?Article=146479; see also John Fauber, Doctors Face 
Pressure to Disclose All Side Pay, JSONLINE (Wis.), Jan. 11, 2009, http://www.jsonline.com/ 
features/health/37397284.html; Andis Robeznieks, Curbs Put on Mass. General Researcher’s 
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and medical companies may compromise the safety of human subjects and the 
integrity of research data.”259  The time is ripe for regulatory reform. 
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